Two rival startups chose to merge instead of fight. This story shows how that risky bet actually saved both companies.
Crossbeam and Reveal were splitting the same network market in half.
Both were burning a lot of cash, growing slower than they should, and confusing customers who had to live in two half-useful products.
The merger was designed to solve four big problems:
Bob Moore, CEO of Crossbeam, saw that both his company and rival Reveal depended on strong network effects. With two big players in the same space, customers were forced to use both tools, and no one got full value. Crossbeam was near $10M ARR but had a very high burn multiple, long sales cycles, and weak pricing compared to the value they wanted to create. Reveal was doing well in Europe with strong logos, but they had similar pain.
Bob and Reveal CEO Simon met, clicked as people, and agreed that one shared network would be far better for customers and for the category. Their first talks stalled because of fresh funding, fuzzy valuations, and unclear targets. A year later, both were still growing fast but missing big goals and burning a lot of money. Customer feedback was loud and simple: please merge the networks. That pushed them back to the table.
They set four clear deal values: customer experience comes first, there is only one company, take the hardest pain early, and focus the story on the future. They agreed a 70/30 equity split, built a clean board, and stacked standard investor protections instead of weird terms. They handled "gun jumping" risk with clean teams and deal teams who could see just enough data but still run at arm's length until close. Day zero was all about message and structure: call it a merger, not an acquisition, show one org chart, make hard cuts, define one year goals, pick one product to win (Crossbeam backend with Reveal style in the front), and run a careful "crossboarding" plan to move Reveal customers over with support.
Within the first year, they migrated customers, shifted everyone to one contract base and one pricing model, rebuilt pricing around seats and data access, and accepted some short term friction to avoid long term mess. They even cut most of the C suite and handed more power to strong mid level leaders and the founders themselves. The result: ARR climbed past $20M toward $25M, burn dropped, NRR rose from about 90 percent to around 105 percent, culture scores improved, and the roadmap finally pointed fully at the future instead of clean up work.